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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1953-1954*
VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It infrequently happens that a court is faced with the problem
of deciding whether constitutional due process requires that some
form of judicial review of administrative decisions be permitted
because most legislation operating to create administrative tri-
bunals either provides for judicial review or else is silent on the
subject.' Only when a statute expressly limits judicial review is
any problem squarely presented and, in the past, such limitations
have been the exception rather than the rule. In 1945, however,
the Illinois legislature did incorporate such a provision in the
Minimum Wage Act,2 a statute permitting the Department of
Labor to investigate and fix minimum wages for women and
children, for judicial scrutiny was there restricted to questions
of law with the decision of the department on fact questions being
made conclusive.3 The constitutionality of this particular provi-
sion was challenged in the case of Vissering Mercantile Company
* Parts I to VI of this survey appeared in the issue for December, 1954, Vol. 33,
No. 1. Limitations of space prevented the full publication thereof in that number.
1 In the latter situation, some type of review is invariably obtainable through
utilization of one or more of the common-law writs, hence the constitutional issue
is never presented.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 198.1 et seq.
3 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 198.13.
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v. Annuwzi04 wherein the Supreme Court, on direct appeal, held
the legislative attempt to limit judicial review violated the due
process clause in both the state and the federal organic laws.5
The court there said that due process required some form of
judicial review whenever an administrative body was acting in a
quasi-legislative manner but not where it was exercising a quasi-
judicial function.6
The decision leaves three questions open for debate, to-wit:
(1) how can it be determined whether an agency is acting in a
legislative or a judicial capacity, (2) what is the logical signifi-
cance of this distinction from the judicial review standpoint, and
(3) what type of review of the facts would satisfy due process
requirements? As to the first, it has been suggested that an
administrative decision affecting the future conduct of a class of
individuals would be legislative in nature whereas a determination
as to the present rights of one individual or one corporation
would be judicial. This test works with precision in the instant
situation since a minimum wage order would regulate the future
conduct of many employers, but the standard is not always so
workable. 7 Even if a satisfactory test might be evolved, the court
fails to give any satisfactory reason why such a distinction should
be made in the first place. Since either function is to be exercised
by an administrative tribunal, the need for, or lack of need for,
judicial supervision would appear to be the same in either situa-
tion. On the third point, while the court specifically states that
due process demands that review be provided, it does not offer
any indication as to the type of review which would be acceptable.
Is a de novo hearing required or will due process be satisfied
41 Ill. (2d) 107, 115 N. E. (2d) 306 (1953), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 385 and 22 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 352. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question: 347 U. S. 949, 74 S. Ct. 380, 98 L. Ed. (adv.)
566 (1954).
5 As the particular section was expressly declared to be severable, the balance
of the statute was not affected and was, in fact, held to be valid.
6 The court cited Nega v. Chicago Railways Co., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N. E. 250 (1925),
and People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 I1. 597, 21 N. E. (2d) 749 (1939),
as upholding this distinction.
7 For instance, in rate-making, elements of both the judicial function and the
legislative function make themselves apparent, a single utility being involved but
the rate being designed to have prospective effect.
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merely by a review of the record, with the court determining
whether or not there is evidence to support the findings of fact?
The latter procedure is the type generally considered acceptable
today and it would be reasonable to suggest that this was the
mode which the Supreme Court had in mind for, if administrative
agencies are to be established to cope with problems which courts
are not skilled to handle, that purpose would be defeated by
requiring the court to hold de novo hearings.
Interpretation of the Illinois Administrative Review Act" was
called for in two cases. In the first of these, that of Chicago
College of Osteopathy v. Puffer,9 the plaintiff filed an application
with the Department of Registration and Education for approval
as a college whose graduates would be permitted to take the state
medical examination. In accordance with the Civil Administrative
Code, 10 the Director appointed a medical examining committee to
investigate the school, which committee, after holding hearings,
made certain findings and recommended that the application be
denied. The Director followed the recommendation and the plain-
tiff then filed suit under the Administrative Review Act request-
ing judicial relief. The trial court affirmed the Director's decision
but, upon appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District re-
versed. The defendant had contended throughout that the mem-
bers of the medical examining committee were necessary parties
who should have been joined with him as defendants. Answering
that contention, the court pointed out that, while the Director
must appoint a committee, the members thereof exercise no final
decision-making power and, as it was the decision of the Director
which was being reviewed, he was the only necessary defendant.
Where the Administrative Review Act applies it is the sole
and exclusive method for obtaining judicial relief," so it becomes
important to determine whether or not the statute applies to a
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
93 Ill. App. (2d) 69, 120 N. E. (2d) 672 (1954). Leave to appeal has been
granted.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 60a.
11 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 265.
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specific administrative decision for common-law writs are then no
longer available. This precise problem was involved in the second
of the cases, that of People ex rel. Vestuto v. O'Connor,'12 a
mandamus action brought to compel the relator's reinstatement
to a police department from which he had been discharged during
the probationary period. The City Civil Service Act authorizes
a department head to discharge an individual during the proba-
tionary period if he requests and receives the consent of the
Civil Service Commission."3 The defendant therein had so re-
quested and received permission to discharge the relator on the
ground that the latter, as a youth, had been arrested, charged
with burglary and malicious mischief, and had been committed to
a parental school for a period of four months. The defendant
argued that since the Civil Service Act provided for review in
the fashion directed by the Administrative Review Act 14 a man-
damus suit was not an appropriate judicial remedy, but both the
trial court and the Appellate Court for the First District took the
position that it was the decision of the Police Commissioner,
rather than that of the Civil Service Commission, which was being
questioned so the matter did not fall within the statutory defini-
tion.15
In arriving at that conclusion, the court apparently felt that
unless the questioned decision has been preceded by some type of
hearing at which a record has been made, the determination could
not be considered an administrative decision within the terms of
the review statute. It is true that that statute contemplates a
review of that which occurred in the administrative stage and
does not provide for a de novo hearing but this does not mean
that a court, under the statute, can only review a certificate of
evidence. 16 In the instant case, the report and request made by
12351 Ill. App. 539, 115 N. E. (2d) 810 (1953).
13 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24%, § 48.
14 Ibid., Ch. 241h, § 77a.
15 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264.
16 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 272(b), which provides that the
defendant does not necessarily have to file a transcript of the evidence. This would
appear to mean that a court would still have jurisdiction to proceed even though
it did not have the full record before It.
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the Police Commissioner had been made part of the record, so the
court could have reviewed the sufficiency thereof in the same
manner as under a request for a writ of mandamus. Bearing in
mind that it was the original intent, in enacting the Administra-
tive Review Act, to provide for a uniform system of judicial
review and to do away with inconsistencies and difficulties present
under the older system which utilized common-law writs, it would
seem that the statute should have been given a broad interpreta-
tion at the time of evaluating its scope.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The cases involving questions of constitutional law are, with
minor exceptions, of the run-of-the-mine character and are note-
worthy only for their effect on specific statutes. In People v. Illi-
nois State Toll Highway Commission,17 the constitutionality of
the statute creating the defendant commission 8 was contested
principally on the ground that it authorized suits against the state
in violation of the state constitution 9 although nine other specific
grounds of invalidity were assigned. The statute did, in fact,
authorize suits by or against the commission, but the court held
that, in view of the considerable autonomy enjoyed by the com-
mission and the fact that the general funds of the state could
never be reached to satisfy its obligations, any such actions as
might be brought would not be suits against the state. This result
appears to have left unanswered a vital question inasmuch as the
commission does not appear to have been given a separate legal
entity and is expressly designated as an instrumentality and
administrative agency of the state. If the State of Illinois is not
the defendant in any such suit, then who is? The cases cited by
the court as having bearing on this point can be distinguished for,
in each of them, there appears to have been a corporate defendant.
17 3 Ill. (2d) 218, 120 N. E. (2d) 35 (1954).
18 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121, §§ 314a26 to 314a5.
'9 11. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 26.
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Although consideration of zoning laws is customarily included
under another topic, the case of Midland Electric Coal Corpora-
tion v. Knox- County,20 in which a county zoning ordinance was
held invalid, is interesting because of the approach adopted by
the court in reaching a decision. A well-recognized test of the
validity of zoning laws lies in a comparison between the value of
the property for its best use with its value for the permitted use.
In the instant case, the court compared the value of the land
for strip-mining, a one-time value, with its value for agricultural
purposes, a continuing value. As might be expected, the two
figures were grossly disproportionate and, on this basis, the court
held the ordinance to be unreasonable. It would seem, however,
that this result should be charged to the comparison of unlike
things rather than to the zoning ordinance itself. The court was
undoubtedly influenced by evidence in the record indicating that
the land would have value of consequence for grazing and forestry
purposes after mining operations had been completed, but this
seems to be a tenuous premise inasmuch as there did not appear
to be any finding, nor indeed any evidence, of the cost to put the
land in a condition suitable for such use.
Aspects of the case of Vissering Mercantile Company v.
AnnMuio,21 under which Section 13 of the Minimum Wage Act 22
was held to be a violation of due process, have been discussed
elsewhere in this survey.23 It might be noted here that an attack
was also made on Section 9 of the Act, one which provides in
substance that, after a hearing and finding of non-compliance with
a directory order, the Department of Labor may cause such fact
to be published in the newspapers within the state. It was con-
tended that this provision would violate the principle of separation
201 Ill. (2d) 200, 115 N. E. (2d) 275 (1953), noted in 42 Ill. B. J. 648.
21 1 Ill. (2d) 108, 115 N. E. (2d) 806 (1953). Hershey, J., dissented. Appeal dis-
missed: 347 U. S. 949, 74 S. Ct. 680, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 566 (1954).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 198.13. The balance of the statute was
permitted to stand.
23 See above, this section, notes 1 to 7.
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of powers24 in that this publication would amount to the imposi-
tion of a penalty, a judicial function. The court disposed of this
contention on the ground that any penalty which might result
was imposed by the public and not by the administrative agency.
It should be noted, however, as a dissenting judge pointed out,
that the penalty would follow as a consequence of the exercise of
a judicial function, to-wit: the hearing and finding of non-observ-
ance, and there would be no substantial difference between a direct
or an indirect imposition of penalties. If the majority decision
is followed to its logical conclusion, it would seem that the
application of the principle of separation of powers has been
limited to matters of form, a result unlikely to have been intended
by the court.
That section of the School Code which provides for the
annexation and detachment of territory of school districts, but
makes no provision for the division of assets between the district
gaining area and the one losing territory,25 was challenged in the
case of People ex rel. Dixon v. Community School District No. 326
on the theory that the section violated due process requirements.
The court noted that school districts, and presumably other bodies
politic, are created by and exist at the sufferance of the legisla-
ture. It followed from this that such bodies have no property
right in their existence of which they may be deprived in violation
of due process of law.
Although discussed elsewhere 27 it is pertinent to note here
that the statute providing for a "cooling off" period before the
commencement of divorce and similar actions28 was held uncon-
stitutional in People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell.29 The specific
defects found to exist lay in the fact that the statute was said to
deprive persons of a prompt remedy for wrongs3" and that the
24 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. III.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 4B- 6.
262 Ill. (2d) 454, 118 N. E. (2d) 241 (1954).
27 See above, Section V, Family Iaw.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, §§ 23-9.
292 fll. (2d) 332, 118 N. E. (2d) 262 (1954), noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 322.
3o 11. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
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judicial conferences therein authorized operated to violate the
principle of separation of powers.
The Prevailing Wage Act 3' was also subject to judicial criti-
cism in Bradley v. Casey.32 It was said there that the statute
would be invalid if applied to the state and other public bodies
since that subject was not expressed in the title. The concluding
paragraph of the 1951 amendment to the statute,33 one which
provides that collective bargaining agreements for similar work
should be considered to be the standard prevailing wage, was held
invalid in that it constituted an improper delegation of legislative
power to private parties.
Three other Illinois statutes suffered a similar fate during
the past year. The Plumbing License Law3 4 was, in the case of
Schroeder v. Binks,3 5 held to violate due process of law in that it
was unrelated to the public health and vested in the master
plumbers arbitrary control over those who might seek to enter
the trade. The Motor Vehicle Use Tax Act 3 6 was successfully
challenged in People ex rel. Schoon v. Carpentier 7 when the court
concluded that the statute was not uniform in operation, hence
violated the revenue article.3 8 The commerce clause of the federal
constitution formed the stumbling block for the Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic on Highways,39 a statute which provided that
the license of a commercial vehicle operator should be suspended
when the licensee had been found guilty of an habitual violation
of the maximum weight and load limits. The court, in Hayes
Freight Lines v. Castle,40 thought that this amounted to an un-
constitutional impediment to interstate commerce and held the
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 39-1 to 39--12.
32415 Ill. 576, 114 N. E. (2d) 681 (1953).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 39s--2.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111/2, §§ 116.1 to 116.35. This statute was,
thereafter, repealed: Ill. Laws 1953, p. 1293, § 31.
85415 Ill. 192, 113 N. E. (2d) 169 (1953).
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.68 et seq.
87 2 Ill. (2d) 468, 118 N. E. (2d) 315 (1954).
38 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 1.
39 I. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 952, § 229b(b).
402 Ill. (2d) 58, 117 N. E. (2d) 106 (1954). Appeal dismissed: 347 U. S. 1009, 74
S. Ct. 865, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 726 (1954).
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statute invalid as so applied but it did indicate that it might be
valid if applied solely to intrastate commerce.
Three statutes were unsuccessfully contested on the ground
that they created improper classifications and were, for that
reason, essentially special legislation enacted in violation of the
state constitution. 41 In the case of Elgin Storage & Transfer
Company v. Perrine,42 the Illinois Motor Carrier Property Act 43
came under fire but the court, in accord with recognized principles
of statutory interpretation, construed the statute so that no im-
proper classifications resulted. The degree of classification pro-
vided in that portion of the Revised Cities and Villages Act which
permits municipalities with a population in excess of 500,000 to
investigate law enforcement4 4 was held to be reasonable in DuBois
v. Gibbons45 since the court felt that there was a real difference
in the situations of the classes there ceated. A similar attack on
another part of the same statute46 fared no better in the case of
Spalding v. Granite City.47 The questioned portion of the statute
permitted municipalities to construct sewerage systems and to
issue revenue bonds for particular localities within municipal
limits. The court again thought a reasonable difference in situa-
tions existed.
Two unsuccessful attacks were also waged on statutes relat-
ing to revenue and the collection thereof. In Department of Reve-
nue v. Warren Petroleum Corporation,48 the Private Car Line
Companies Act 49 was charged with violating both the revenue
article of the state constitution" and the equal protection clause
of the federal constitution 5' on the theory that it served to
41 Il. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
42 2 Ill. (2d) 28, 116 N. E. (2d) 868 (1953).
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 282.1 et seq.
44 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-111.
45 2 Ili. (2d) 392, 118 N. E. (2d) 295 (1954).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 60- 12 et seq.
47415 Ill. 274, 113 N. E. (2d) 567 (1953).
482 Ill. (2) 483, 119 N. E. (2d) 215 (1954).
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 372.1 et seq.
50 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 1.
51 U. S. Const., 14th Amend.
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discriminate between foreign corporations and domestic ones, the
former being taxed at a state average rate whereas the latter
would be taxed at a local rate. The court, however, pointed out
that such discrimination as might exist would not necessarily be
harmful to the foreign corporation and also that strict mathe-
matical equality is not necessary so long as the tax rests on some
reasonable basis. The statute permitting the sale and assignment
of special assessment judgment liens5 2 was challenged in People
ex rel. Drobnick v. City of Waukegan.53 The basis of the attack
was that it allowed the collection of taxes by private parties,
but the court thought that the sale itself was a collection and any
subsequent enforcement of the lien by the assignee was not con-
sidered to be a collection of taxes as understood in the constitu-
tion.
In closing this section, it might be appropriate to note that
the case of City of Chicago v. Willett Company54 seems to have
been finally interred with the latest holding of the Illinois Supreme
Court. After two trips to the state supreme court 55 and one to
the United States Supreme Court,56 not counting a clarifying
opinion in between, 57 it has finally been decided that the municipal
license tax there imposed on carters is constitutional and the
offending carrier now appears destined to be obliged to pay the
penalty for its non-observance thereof.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Except as to matters already noted, 58 about the only case
which could be said to possess value in the field of municipal
corporations is the rather obvious holding of the Supreme Court
52 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 84-56.
53 1 Ill. (2d) 456,116 N. E. (2d) 365 (1954).
541 Ill. (2d) 311, 115 N. E,. (2d) 785 (1953).
55 See the prior report in 406 Ii. 286, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 (1950).
56344 U. S. 574, 73 S. Ct. 460, 97 L. Ed. 559 (1953).
57409 Ill. 480, 101 N. E. (2d) 205 (1951). The clarifying opinion was provided
in response to a request set out in 341 U. S. 913, 71 S. Ct. 734, 95 L. Ed. 1349
(1951).
58 See above, Section II, Contracts, notes 26 to 29, for a discussion of the case
of Greene v. City of Danville, 350 Ill. App. 440, 113 N. E. (2d) 348 (1953), in which
leave to appeal has been denied, on the point of the possibility of establishing
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in the case of City of Chicago v. Sachs59 wherein the issue turned
on the applicability of a municipal zoning ordinance to the use
which defendant made of certain real estate. The ordinance in
question specifically mentioned, among permissible uses, such
things as grade schools, high schools, colleges, and universities.
The defendant operated a kindergarten play school for the benefit
of those of pre-school age and was convicted of having violated
the ordinance in question. The court agreed that defendant's use
was not included in the categories mentioned but then concluded
that the ordinance was invalid, when so applied, because it tended
to create arbitrary distinctions where no real differences existed.
The conviction was, therefore, reversed.
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Issues relating to segregation were involved in the case of
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion,60 a case in which a petition had been addressed to the
commission requesting that the carrier be directed to cease, in its
interstate operations originating in Illinois, from assigning pas-
sengers to specific cars within the state in a manner which sepa-
rated passengers on the basis of race or color, and also from
using a car-card system which accomplished this result. The com-
mission issued such an order but, on appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the state commission had no jurisdiction
over the practice of a railroad as to seating passengers travelling
in interstate commerce and a determination as to whether or not
the particular rule was discriminatory rested with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. It should be noted that the carrier in
question makes no discrimination as to its intrastate passengers
for to do so would violate local law.61
municipal liability on a quasi-contractual basis where no express contract exists.
A number of cases affecting municipal corporations of varied character are also
mentioned in the immediately preceding topic of Constitutional Law. They have
not, for obvious reasons, been repeated.
59 1 Ill. (2d) 342, 115 N. E. (2d) 762 (1954).
60 2 Ill. (2d) 382, 118 N. E. (2d) 435 (1954).
61 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 125 et seq.
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A decision of first impression, although of rather specialized
interest, may be found in the case of Mandel Brothers, Inc. v.
Chicago Tunnel Terminal Company.62 The tunnel company there
concerned, a public utility operating an underground railway,
filed a revised rate schedule with the Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion which would have resulted in almost doubling the cost of
transporting coal. The commission temporarily suspended the
increased rate schedule and conducted a hearing, at which the
complainant, a customer, appeared to oppose the increase, but
thereafter found the increase to be just and proper. On appeal
by the customer, the commission's order was set aside. There-
after, the customer filed a complaint for reparations," being the
difference between the sum paid and the old rate which had
prevailed before the controversy arose. This complaint was de-
nied and, upon appeal, the question was raised as to whether or
not a rate which had been approved by the commission after a
hearing could be termed excessive even though such rate had been
set aside upon judicial review. The Supreme Court held it was
proper to deny reparations, noting a distinction between a situa-
tion in which the carrier establishes its own rate, later successfully
challenged, and one wherein the commission fixes the rate by its
own order; reparation being allowed in the former situation but
not in the latter.
Far more important is the holding of the Supreme Court in
the case of Mississippi River Fuel Corporation v. Illinois Com-
merce Commission.6 4 The corporation there concerned had con-
tracted individually with twenty-three large industrial users of
natural gas to furnish them with supplies and also furnished gas,
as required, to two public utilities who served the public generally.
The state commission found the supplier to be a public utility
within the meaning of Section 10 of the Public Utilities Act 65 and
ordered it to comply with appropriate regulations. The circuit
62 2 Il. (2d) 205, 117 N. E. (2d) 774 (1954).
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 76.
641 Ill. (2d) 509, 116 N. E. (2d) 394 (1953), noted in 1954 Ill. L. Forum 141.
Schaefer, Ch. J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Hershey, J.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 10.3.
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court reversed the commission and, upon further appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed. Without pursuing the facts recited in
the majority opinion and in the dissent, it might be sufficient to
say that the arguments for and against the decision came close
to check-mate, for they are pretty well in balance. The decision,
then, must be said to revolve around policy as viewed by a
majority of the judges. Prior Illinois decisions, cited on both
sides, did not meet the instant case on all fours, so any analogy
or interpretation would be colored by an advocate's understand-
ing of public policy as applied to corporations engaged in a type
of business usually serviced by utilities and considered to be
public in character. It might be noted, however, that if the sup-
plier in question should extend its services to any considerable
degree, the holding might well be re-appraised and the judgment
then might be to the contrary.
TAXATION
Notice has already been taken of the fact that certain of the
taxing statutes were subjected to attack on constitutional grounds"6
but it might be considered appropriate, at this point, to emphasize
that the Private Car Line Companies Tax Act 6 7 was sustained in
the case of Department of Revenue v. Warren Corporation68
against an attack predicated primarily upon the equal protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; that certain provisions
of the Revised Cities and Villages Act relating to the sale and
assignment of special assessment judgment liens69 were upheld
in the case of People ex rel. Drobnick v. City of Waukegan;70
that in City of Chicago v. Willett Company7' the Supreme Court
disposed of several additional objections urged against the valid-
ity of a municipal ordinance taxing carters; but that the Motor
66 See above, this section, particularly notes 36 to 38 and 48 to 57.
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 372.1 et seq.
682 Ill. (2d) 483, 119 N. E. (2d) 215 (1954).
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 84- 56.
70 1 Ill. (2d) 456, 116 N. E. (2d) 365 (1954).
71 1 Ill. (2d) 311, 115 N. E. (2d) 785 (1953).
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Vehicle Use Tax Act 72 was successfully challenged, in People ex
rel. Schoon v. Carpentier7 3 because it lacked the degree of uni-
formity required by the revenue article of the state constitution.
74
Turning to matters of taxation proper, the Supreme Court,
in Gaither v. Lager75 held that proceedings conducted under the
so-called Scavenger Act 76 were as much subject to the "strict
construction policy" traditionally applied as were tax deeds re-
sulting from county court sales. The underlying tax proceeding
was, of course, an involuntary one,77 brought before the court by
means of a suit for possession. The notice given by the purchaser
was held not to comply with Section 263 of the Revenue Act 7s in
that it did not specify the particular years for which the taxes
were delinquent and also because it did not specify whether the
sale was for general taxes, for special assessments, or both. The
legal correctness of the decision probably cannot be assailed. Cer-
tainly, the provisions with reference to notice in perfecting a tax
deed pursuant to the Scavenger Act are identical with those
applicable to perfecting a deed under a county court sale, hence
the court cannot be criticized for giving such language the same
meaning in both contexts. However, the effect of the decision
would seem to be such as to deprive diligent public officials,
determined to realize a portion at least of the taxes and special
assessments upon delinquent properties, of what had been sup-
posed to be an effective implement, particularly since it had been
commonly believed that the equity foreclosure proceedings pro-
vided for by the Scavenger Act, and the procedure for perfecting
title pursuant thereto, would not be subject to strict technical
limitations. It may be anticipated, then, that the effect of the
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.68 et seq.
73 2 Ill. (2d) 468, 118 N. U. (2d) 315 (1954).
74 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 1.
752 Ii. (2d) 293, 118 N. E. (2d) 4 (1954), noted in 42 111. B. J. 720.
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 716a.
77 It would seem clear that the decision holds no implications with reference to
those voluntary proceedings which are customarily utilized for clearing the lien
of unpaid taxes, and sometimes special assessments.
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 744.
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instant decision will be to discourage purchasers at involuntary
sales and limit proceedings under the statute to voluntary ones.
7 9
Two cases called for further clarification of issues arising
under the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. 0 In the case entitled
The Burrows Company v. Hollingsworth,"' the Supreme Court
indicated that sales to persons who re-transfer personal property
in the course of service occupations are not taxable unless the
person transfers tangible personal property both (1) for use or
consumption, and (2) not for resale in any form as tangible
personal property. It had been the position of the Department
of Revenue that, by its holding in the case of Modern Dairy
Company v. Department of Revenue, 2 the Supreme Court had
obviated the second of these requirements. The case was one
involving sales made by pharmaceutical and similar supply houses
to doctors and hospitals, with the latter furnishing these supplies
to patients, some of whom paid therefor either specifically or as
a part of the service rendered but others of whom did not pay
at all, i. e., were charity cases. It seems to have been conceded
by all parties that, with reference to sales of tangible personal
property later applied or distributed to charity patients, the tax
would be applicable.8 3  With reference to supplies applied or
furnished to paying patients, however, the court held, in effect,
that these were resold by the doctor or hospital, and that, accord-
ingly, the sale to the doctor or hospital was not a sale at retail
within the purview of the Act.
Another facet of the case may be of even broader scope and
significance. The question concerned the effect to be given to a
permanent injunction under circumstances where it was later
79 The hope of securing legislative relief against the doctrine of strict construc-
tion, as applied to equity foreclosurers, is probably remote in view of the re-
luctance of legislators to sponsor or support legislation which might result in
certain of their constituents losing property for failure to pay taxes. The burden
thus imposed upon other taxpayers seems to be lost sight of when legislation of
this type is under consideration.
so Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
81415 Ill. 202, 112 N. E. (2d) 706 (1953).
82413 Ill. 55, 108 N. E. (2d) 8 (1953).
83 The case of Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 108 N.
E. (2d) 8 (1953), specifically so held.
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found that the injunction had been issued in reliance upon an
erroneous construction of the law. Usually, in that event, the
rights and obligations of the parties would be determined as if
no injunction had ever been issued. The Supreme Court, however,
as to this aspect of the case, held without equivocation that the
doctrine of res judicata prevented retroactive taxation of those
transactions which were covered by the injunction and which had
been entered into prior to its actual modification.
In the second case, that of Material Service Corporation v.
Hollingsworth,4 the Supreme Court enunciated what would seem
to be a necessary concomitant of the position mentioned above
with reference to the juridical effect of a permanent injunction
predicated upon an erroneous construction of the law. The mate-
rialman there concerned, selling to building contractors, had
enjoyed the benefit of such a permanent injunction and contended
that the court issuing the injunction had no power to modify it,
where there had been no change in the facts or in the statutory
law, but only a change in the position of the Supreme Court as
to what the law was. This conclusion was rejected when the
Supreme Court said a lower tribunal would have jurisdiction "to
modify or vacate its injunction to meet changing conditions of
fact or of law, legislative or judicial."8 5
TRADE REGULATION
Cases based on the Illinois Fair Trade Act 6 seldom arise,
so it is worth mentioning that, in Sunbeam, Corporation v. Central
Housekeeping Mart, 7 the Appellate Court for the First District
there pointed out that an inference based on the statute would
support the view that a manufacturer would be permitted to enter
into a contract with a wholesaler containing a stipulation to the
effect that the wholesaler should sell only to those retailers who
would agree to resell the articles involved at fair trade prices
only. Refusal on the part of the manufacturer there concerned
84 415 Ill. 284, 112 N. E. (2d) 703 (1953).
85 415 Ill. 284 at 288, 112 N. E. (2d) 703 at 705.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121/, § 188 et seq.
872 Ill. App. (2d) 543, 120 N. E. (2d) 362 (1954).
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to sell its products to a retailer who was unwilling to enter into
such an agreement, or to comply with fair trade prices set by the
manufacturer, was said not to constitute an unlawful boycott.
VIII. TORTS
While Illinois courts have decided many cases in the past
year involving interesting questions of tort law few of these cases
were in any way novel and only one case can be said to be of
paramount importance. That case was the one entitled Amann v.
Faidy' wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action
would lie for the wrongful death of a child who was negligently
injured while en ventre sa mere but who was subsequently born
alive only to die thereafter as a result of the injury so inflicted.
The case has already received so much attention that further
comment on the holding would be superfluous.
It is still too early to say that a cause of action will lie in
Illinois for a negligent injury resulting in an interference with
contract rights, 2 but a recent case appears to have taken a step
in that direction. In American Transportation Company v. U. S.
Sanitary Specialties Corporation,5 the plaintiffs were lessees of
certain premises which they used as a place in which to store
voting machines in performance of a contract with a municipality.
It was alleged there that certain contractors, employed by the
lessor to remodel the premises, had trespassed upon the demised
premises and performed their work in such a negligent fashion
that the premises were rendered unfit for storage, causing the
municipality to cancel its contract with the plaintiffs. The Appel-
late Court for the First District held that, on these facts, a cause
of action had been stated against the contractors. 4
1415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. (2d) 412 (1953), noted in 32 CmAoAo-KE T LAw R W
230, 3 DePaul L. Rev. 257, and 42 I1. B. J. 244, reversing 348 I. App. 37, 107 N. E.
(2d) 868 (1952). See also the related case of Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ii. 496, 114
N. E. (2d) 721 (1953), reversing 348 Ill. App. 322, 108 N. E. (2d) 830 (1952).
2 The leading Illinois case of Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Il. 608, 52 N. E. 924 and
51 N. E. 524 (1898), established the rule that liability for interference with com-
mercial contracts would depend upon a showing that the defendant had acted
maliciously.
82 Il1. App. (2d) 144, 118 N. E. (2d) 793 (1954).
4 The court seemed to rely heavily upon the allegation that a trespass was com-
mitted, finding support for its decision in two prior Illinois cases in each of which
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By the holding in Ney v. Yellow Cab Company,5 that diversity
of opinion which existed between the Appellate Courts of the
state6 was ended when the Supreme Court decided that the conduct
of a motorist in leaving his vehicle unattended with the motor
running and the key in the ignition,7 thereby enabling a thief to
steal the car and injure another, would present a problem of
proximate causation which would have to be determined by a jury.
Somewhat disturbing in its implications is the case of Bonnier
v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company.8  In that
case, the defendant to a Federal Employers' Liability Act suit
had contended that no recovery should be allowed because the
plaintiff was, at the time of injury, violating a federal statute
prohibiting the stealing, possessing or carrying away of goods in
interstate commerceY The Supreme Court, reversing an Appellate
Court holding which had given judgment notwithstanding a ver-
dict for the plaintiff, cited Illinois cases dealing with violations
by plaintiffs of traffic regulations, delivered the usual discourse
on the difference between a condition and a cause, and concluded
that it was for the jury to decide whether the plaintiff's illegal
conduct was the proximate cause of the injury.1°
a landlord recovered loss of rent from a trespasser who had wilfully disturbed
the tenant's possession. The court also quoted from an article in 41 Harv. L. Rev.
732 which advocated liability for negligent interference with contractual relation-
ships.
52 Ill. (2d) 74, 117 N. E. (2d) 74 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT L&w REVIEW
313, 42 Ill. B. J. 580, and 1954 Ill. L. Forum 347, affirming 348 Ill. App. 161, 108 N.
E. (2d) 508 (1953). Hershey, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
6 Contrast the decision in Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N. E. (2d)
537 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 225, with the decision in
Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. (2d) 878 (1951), noted in 30
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REview 277.
7 That conduct is prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 189.
82 Ill. (2d) 606, 119 N. E. (2d) 254 (1954), reversing 351 Ill. App. 34, 113 N. E.
(2d) 615 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 189.
9 18 U. S. C. A. § 659.
10 The Court failed to make any distinction between the relative immorality
involved in violating a traffic regulation as contrasted with the violation of a
theft provision. Also to be noted is the possibility, mentioned in the Appellate
Court opinion, that part of the federal statute involved might impose liability
without criminal intent. On a related matter, the Appellate Court for the Second
District, in a case decided too late to be included in this survey, denied a cause
of action for wrongful death against one who had negligently performed an abor-
tion on the ground that the dead woman had consented to the act: Castronovo v.
Murawsky, 3 Ill. App. (2d) 168, 120 N. E. (2d) 871 (1954).
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Still another question of proximate cause plagued an Illinois
court in the case of Semeniuk v. Chentis," a case wherein the
plaintiff claimed to have been injured by a BB pellet fired by a
seven-year old boy from an air rifle sold by the defendant-
merchant to the boy's parents. The Appellate Court for the First
District held that a cause of action had been stated against the
merchant because it was alleged that the vendor knew, at the
time of the sale, that the rifle was to be given to the boy and he
then knew, or ought to have known, of the lad's inexperience.12
Two attractive nuisance cases should be mentioned. In the
first, that of Ellison v. Commonwealth Edison Company,13 the
Appellate Court for the First District held the doctrine in-
applicable to a retaining wall on defendant's land which was
inadequate to prevent youngsters from scaling the wall and swim-
ming in a public canal abutting the premises. In the other, that
of Kahn v. James Burton Company,'4 the same court decided that
lumber piled on a vacant lot adjacent to a construction project
would not amount to an attractive nuisance.
In closing this survey, it might be appropriate to note that
the liability of a motion picture theater operator appears to have
been extended by the decision of the Appellate Court for the First
District in the case of Davis v. Theatre Amusement Company.15
The plaintiff in that action claimed that he had slipped upon
debris in an unlighted aisle of the theater. In affirming a judgment
of the trial court for plaintiff, the reviewing tribunal concluded,
apparently for the first time in this state, that a theater aisle in
total darkness, except for the illumination provided by the showing
of a motion picture, would create an inherently dangerous condi-
tion, particularly when cluttered by debris.
111 Ill. App. (2d) 508, 117 N. E. (2d) 883 (1954), noted in 28 Temple L. Q. 156.
12 The liability of a vendor for the sale of a firearm directly to a minor appears
to be well established in most American jurisdictions: 20 A. L. R. (2d) 119. Where,
however, the sale is to an adult, as occurred in the instant case, liability would
seem to rest upon a precarious foundation.
13 351 Ill. App. 58, 113 N. E. (2d) 471 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
14 1 Ill. App. (2d) 370, 117 N. E. (2d) 670 (1954), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvIEw 348. Leave to appeal has been granted.
15 351 Ill. App. 517, 115 N. E. (2d) 915 (1953), noted in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
RLvniw 270. Leave to appeal has been denied.
